DRAMATIC STRUCTURES IN CAESAR'S *BELLUM CIVILE*

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Caesar's commentaries reveal a steady literary development. Sentence structures change from the overloaded periodic writing of the first book of the *Bellum Gallicum* to the type in *Bellum Civile* prescribed by Cicero as ideal for historiography—*fusum atque tractum et cum lenitate quadam aequabili profluens.*[1] The ratio of direct to indirect speeches increases from one to seven in *BG* to one to four in *BC.*[2] One of the most significant changes to appear in *BC* has to do with the author's attitude toward his subject. In the later work there is an increase of abstract language growing out of a serious attempt to discover universal norms and laws behind individual events.[3] The increased depth of Caesar's historical perspective is proved by another factor besides abstract language—the dramatic structure of major episodes, by which is meant the arrangement of events into the three stages of success, hybris, and catastrophe. It is the purpose of this study to outline the structures of four major episodes and to point out, as they appear, indications of Caesar's dramatic conception.

[1] J. J. Schlicher, "The Development of Caesar's Narrative Style," *CP* 31 (1936) 216; the Latin quote is from *De oratore* 2.15.64. Other studies devoted to style which have noticed development are P. T. Eden, "Caesar's Style: Inheritance Versus Intelligence," *Glotta* 40 (1962) 117; and Michel Rambaud, "Essai sur le style du Bellum civile," *IL* 14 (1962) 113.

[2] Hans Oppermann, *Caesar: Der Schriftsteller und sein Werk* (Leipzig 1933) 73. M. L. W. Laistner, *The Greater Roman Historians* (Berkeley 1963) 42, comments that in using direct speeches Caesar "adopted the recognized literary device of ancient historians, as though he would prove to his contemporaries that he could write history according to the established literary canons." A similar view is expressed by Ernst Howald, *Vom Geist antiker Geschichtsschreibung* (Munich 1944) 116.

[3] Oppermann (above, note 2) 188, counts twelve *sententiae* in *BC* as opposed to five for *BG*. J. D. Craig, "The General Reflection in Caesar's Commentaries," *CR* 45 (1931) 107–10, finds sixteen in *BC* and ten in *BG*. See also R. Preiswerk, "Sententiae in Caesars Commentarien," *MH* 2 (1945) 213–26.

FIRST EPISODE: 1.37–87

A. Pompeian success: 1.40–52.[4]

Military operations in Spain began inauspiciously. Before Caesar's arrival the legate, Gaius Fabius, barely escaped losing two legions and all the cavalry when a bridge across the Sicoris was destroyed, isolating them from the main camp. Only prompt action on Fabius' part prevented the Pompeian generals, Afranius and Petreius, from exploiting this stroke of good fortune (*occasione et beneficio fortunae*, 40.7). Soon after his arrival Caesar offered battle; but the attempt to capture a strategic knoll between the enemy camp and the town of Ilerda led to a succession of blunders costing the lives of seventy men and the loss of the important objective. The opening statement of the next section emphasizes the growing intensity of misfortunes: *accidit etiam repentinum incommodum* (48.1). Both bridges, vital to supply and communication, had been destroyed by an unusually severe storm. The ensuing food shortage was made even more distressing by the prosperity of the enemy: *at exercitus Afrani omnium rerum abundabat copia* (49.1). The calamities continued as a large supply train, unable to cross the river to Caesar, was attacked and forced to take refuge in the mountains. Finally, the price of provisions rose, the strength of the troops diminished for want of food, and the troubles increased each day. At this point Caesar summarizes the situation (52.3):

> tam paucis diebus magna erat rerum facta commutatio ac se fortuna inclinaverat, ut nostri magna inopia necessariarum rerum conflictarentur, illi omnibus abundarent rebus superioresque haberentur.

B. Hybris: 1.53.

At the nadir of Caesar's difficulties and the zenith of prosperity for the Pompeians, an entire section of the narrative is devoted to describing the enemy's feelings of confidence. They had written excessively gloating accounts (*pleniora etiam atque uberiora*, 53.1) of their successes.

[4] To avoid extensive documentation, rubrics have been provided locating, in a general way, each of the three structural parts in each episode. No attempt has been made to be exact in defining each part, since the overlap of the structural parts often makes that impossible. It is sufficient for my purposes to demonstrate a sequence of success, hybris, and catastrophe. The terms are self-explanatory, except that "catastrophe" means the opposite of "success" and does not necessarily include peripeteia. My text is the 1957 Teubner edition of Alfred Klotz.

These reports were further enhanced by rumor, so that the war appeared almost won. At Rome visitors with congratulatory greetings thronged the home of Afranius. Many hastened to join Pompey in Greece in order to demonstrate their loyalty before the victory was sealed. This section, in which Caesar dwells on the mental attitude of his foes at the pinnacle of prosperity, adds nothing to the actual record of events. It has a dramatic purpose. The hybristic disposition of the enemy growing out of a succession of good fortunes is described just before the peripeteia, after which the Pompeians are led through a series of surprising calamities to their defeat.

C. Catastrophe: 1.54–84.

The peripeteia is marked by two events—the construction of a new bridge and a naval victory at Massilia. The second event is of special interest, because its description creates a considerable break in the narrative of events in Spain. This account is generally regarded as an insertion. If it is detached, both ends of its context (55.2 and 59.2) fit together perfectly. Although Caesar marks the peripeteia at the end of his description of the naval battle (*hoc cum primum Caesari ad Ilerdam nuntiatur, simul perfecto ponte celeriter fortuna mutatur*, 59.1), in the next section he indicates a second peripeteia, which includes mention of the bridge but not of the naval battle (60.5):

> magna celeriter commutatio rerum. perfecto ponte, magnis quinque civitatibus ad amicitiam adiunctis, expedita re frumentaria, exstinctis rumoribus de auxiliis legionum, quae cum Pompeio per Mauretaniam venire dicebantur, multae longinquiores civitates ab Afranio desciscunt et Caesaris amicitiam sequuntur.

It is not necessary to enter into the dispute regarding the time of the naval battle's insertion and the reason for it.[5] What may be noted

[5] The account of the first naval battle (1.56–59.1) is thought to have been an insertion by both Alfred Klotz, "Zu Caesars Bellum Civile," *RhM* 66 (1911) 85, 89–91, and Karl Barwick, *Caesars Commentarii und das Corpus Caesarianum* (Leipzig 1938) 151–52. (Barwick also elaborates his views in a more recent work, which I have not seen, *Caesars Bellum Civile: Tendenz, Abfassungszeit, und Stil* [Leipzig 1951]). The agreement of the two distinguished scholars is superficial. Barwick's major assumption is that *BC* was written to be propaganda; consequently, each of the two books (1–2 and 3) was published at the end of the year in which the events transpired. The account of the naval battle was inserted after Caesar had returned to Massilia from Spain, since it was not until then that he received the necessary details of it. Nevertheless, *BC* 1–2 was completed

without controversy is the concern for indicating a turning point at this stage of the narrative. Although the choice of an event as a turning point was, to a certain degree, arbitrary, Caesar felt compelled to mark the beginning of a different course of events following the description of the enemy's hybris.

Frightened by the change in Caesar's fortune, Afranius and Petreius began to withdraw towards Celtiberia. Thinking that they had stolen a march on Caesar, they were soon set upon and impeded by his cavalry and later dismayed by the unexpected sight of the infantry. With five miles separating them from the sanctuary of the mountains, they succumbed to Caesar's feigned withdrawal and realised their deception too late. The escape route was blocked, and four light cohorts were decimated by Caesar's cavalry. The Pompeian troops and Afranius were ready to surrender; but Petreius compelled them to take a new oath of allegiance to Pompey and to execute those of Caesar's forces who were caught fraternizing in the camp. This action, however, created no significant change in the course of events; it was merely a retarding factor (*rem ad pristinam belli rationem redegit*, 76.5), as the Pompeians, after protracting their futile struggle, finally surrendered. Their complete humiliation is summarized by Afranius' speech at 84.4–5:

> nunc vero paene ut feras circummunitos prohiberi aqua, prohiberi ingressu, neque corpore dolorem neque animo ignominiam ferre posse. itaque se victos confiteri; orare atque obsecrare, siqui locus misericordiae relinquatur, ne ad ultimum supplicium progredi necesse habeant.

The plot structure is as follows: (1) a series of increasingly severe misfortunes for Caesar (good fortunes for the Pompeians), (2) a detailed description of hybris, (3) a peripeteia signaled by the building of the

and published at the end of 49. The explanation of Klotz is quite different. *BC* was never completed, at least in the sense that it was ready for publication. Klotz sees in many passages a "skizzenhaft Charakter," which suggests a method of literary composition similar to that of the *Aeneid*. The naval battle was inserted, but Caesar died before he could make it fit the context smoothly. For me this explanation of the unfinished state of *BC* has great appeal, particularly since many of the troublesome passages are those in which the writer is not merely narrating facts but interpreting (as in 1.59.1), describing (as in the description of the siege tower, 2.10) or even inventing (as in Curio's speech, 2.32). The rough passages, therefore, suggest literary problems in *BC* which, unfortunately, are often minimized.

bridge and the news of victory at Massilia, (4) a denouement—a succession of surprising misfortunes for the Pompeians, (5) a retarding factor, Petreius' refusal to permit the army to surrender, (6) the surrender and acknowledgment of defeat. It is necessary, of course, to remember that these events actually occurred and that Caesar reported what had occurred; however, Oppermann's statement that Caesar's deeds speak for themselves, while true in one sense, can be misleading.[6] Throughout the episode there is evidence that Caesar had conceptualized the events in a dramatic framework. First is the dramatic emphasis in the key incidents. Such phrases as *occasione et beneficio fortunae* (40.7), *repentinum incommodum* (48.1), *magna erat rerum facta commutatio ac se fortuna inclinaverat* (52.3) either introduce or conclude the stages in Caesar's worsening situation. Caesar's language leaves no doubt about the peripeteia—*fortuna mutatur* (59.1). A second indication of dramatic conception can be found in the description of the enemy's hybris and its placement immediately before the peripeteia. Thirdly, the antithetical balance provides the symmetry necessary to dramatic structure. The frightened surprise of the Pompeians (*perterritis animis adversariorum*, 61.1; *nova re perterritus*, 65.1) emphasizes their abrupt loss of hybris; and the words of Afranius, *perpessos omnium rerum inopiam* (84.4), are in poignant contrast to Caesar's description of their earlier state—*illi omnibus abundarent rebus superioresque haberentur* (52.4).

SECOND EPISODE: 2.17–21

The second phase of the Spanish campaign lacks the pathos of the first phase. It is almost humorously anticlimactic. But Caesar's concern with good fortune as the cause of hybris and folly dominates his account. The historian Polybius[7] had manifested the same interest. He observed that the story of Regulus was proof that one must not rely on Fortune, especially in prosperous times. For Regulus, who had previously denied pity to others, was later led away a prisoner to plead

[6] Oppermann (above, note 2) 6: "Wie sie sind, sollen Caesars Taten für sich sprechen." Emphasis on Caesar's "Sachlichkeit" has in part the good intention of rescuing him from the charge of political "Tendenz," but in the process it tends to deny his philosophical "Tendenz," his unified conception of the forces at work behind events.

[7] 1.35.1–7. On this passage see B. L. Ullman, "History and Tragedy," *TAPA* 73 (1942) 40–41.

for his life. Varro, the protagonist of Caesar's account, though unable to claim the noble stature of a Regulus, shared the same disastrous commitment to Fortune.

A. Success: 2.17.

In the opening stages of the Civil War, when Pompey was suffering reverses in Italy, Varro's attitude remained ambivalent. He spoke kindly of Caesar but maintained his official loyalty to Pompey (*amicissime de Caesare loquebatur: praeoccupatum sese legatione ab Cn. Pompeio, teneri obstrictum fide*, 17.1–2). But a succession of good fortunes for the Pompeians—Caesar had been held up at Massilia, the Pompeian generals in Spain had joined forces, great numbers of auxiliary forces were expected, the entire nearer province had joined Pompey, and Caesar's forces at Ilerda had been reduced to starvation (or so it was reported) —caused Varro to abandon his neutrality and to dance in step to Fortune (*se quoque ad motus fortunae movere coepit*, 17.5).[8]

B. Hybris: 2.18.1–5.

Varro's newly acquired confidence in Pompey's cause led to acts of hybris and folly. He plundered the temple of Hercules. Against Caesar he held thundering harangues claiming that Caesar had suffered reverses and arguing (ironically) that he had this information from reliable sources. He imposed heavy tolls on those suspected of sympathy for Caesar. Finally, he compelled his entire province to swear an oath of allegiance to Pompey. The oath is particularly interesting, since in all three of the ill-fated Pompeian confrontations with Caesar an oath of allegiance is taken shortly before defeat or surrender.[9] In Varro's case the oath is followed by news of Caesar's decisive victory at Ilerda, which, in effect, marks the beginning of Varro's defeat. He continued to make war preparations—he had committed himself by word and deed so that he had no other choice—but his strategy was now defensive.

[8] Professor Lilian B. Lawler has informed me that this phrase is a metaphor from dancing. The traditional Roman disdain for the dance as a frivolous occupation may have prompted Caesar to apply the metaphor to Varro.

[9] In addition to the present instance, we have already noted the futile vow imposed upon his troops by Petreius (1.76.2–4), and later the same action will be taken by Labienus at Pharsalus (3.87.5–7).

C. Catastrophe: 2.19–20.

The denouement consists of a series of recognitions, more embarrassing than calamitous, as the peoples of Corduba, Carmo, and Gades, towns vital to Varro's strategy, announce their allegiance to Caesar, while, most embarrassing of all, one of Varro's legions deserts before his eyes. Terrified by these developments (*quibus rebus perterritus*, 20.6), Varro announces his intention to march to Italica; but, when told that its gates also have been closed to him, he surrenders to Caesar.

In each of the two episodes examined above it is possible to see a dramatic structure consisting of success, hybris, and catastrophe. In the Afranius-Petreius episode the structure is more elaborate, with greater care given to noting the significance of each incident to the structure as a whole; the emphasis is more on events than on personalities. In the Varro episode Caesar's interest is focused on character; the important changes that occur are the changes in Varro's attitude from ambivalence to hybris and from hybris to fright and surrender. One element important for dramatic effect, the use of direct speeches, is lacking in both episodes, and it will be necessary to account for this omission.

A characteristic of Caesar's commentaries is the increase of dramatic tension, achieved by a growing frequency of direct speeches, toward the ends of compositional unities.[10] This apparent compositional law may account in part for the absence of direct speeches in the narrative of the Spanish campaign, which appears early in *BC* 1–2. It should be noted, however, that Curio's combined speeches at the end of *BC* 1–2 number almost twice as many Teubner lines as all the direct speeches in *BC* 3, so that the dramatic emphasis of the African campaign is at least equal to that of the Greek campaign. The events themselves, more than the operation of a compositional law, seem to have been responsible for the increased dramatic tension. Unlike the rest of the military engagements in Caesar's account of the Civil War, those in Africa and in Greece were decided by set battles between large armies

[10] Detlef Rasmussen, *Caesars Commentarii: Stil und Stilwandel am Beispiel der direkten Rede* (Göttingen 1963) 105. Rasmussen makes this characteristic ("Das Prinzip der Steigerung") the thesis of his provocative book.

on even ground. The leading protagonists, Curio and Pompey, were individuals whose reputations and personalities could easily excite the imagination. The same dramatic structure of success, hybris, and catastrophe is maintained, as will be shown; the difference is one of greater emphasis and art.

THIRD EPISODE: 2.23–44

A. Success: 2.23–28.

A series of successful actions reflecting Curio's brilliant and energetic leadership marked the beginning of the African campaign. The sight of his fleet sent the Pompeian ships into terrified retreat. His cavalry pillaged supply trains entering Utica and routed a large detachment of Numidian cavalry. At the same time two hundred enemy supply ships in Utica harbor were captured. For these achievements Curio was hailed imperator. On the next day the cavalry again enjoyed a stunning success over substantial reinforcements sent by King Juba. These events are described in a direct manner, and the favorable impression that is received of Curio's generalship is the result of Caesar's brisk narrative of the facts rather than a concentrated study of Curio's character. The perspective soon changes, however, from the events themselves to their main participant.

B. Hybris: 2.29–35.

When the soldiers' loyalty had been compromised by an appeal from the enemy to desert, Curio summoned his staff to discuss the situation. Two proposals were advanced—a desperate, all-out assault against the enemy fortifications and furtive withdrawal in the middle of the night. Curio rejected as extreme both proposals and urged that other courses of action be tried. He then called an assembly of the troops and addressed to them an eloquent *suasoria*. Following his precept to the officers, *felicitas rerum gestarum exercitus benevolentiam imperatoribus et res adversae odia concilient* (31.3), Curio emphasized past success—both Caesar's and his own. Caesar's recent victory in Spain he claimed had already decided the fortune of the war (*diiudicata iam belli fortuna*, 32.6). He enumerated his previous successes—all proofs of his own *diligentia* and *fortuna* (32.11). Moreover, the Pompeian defeats in Italy and Spain prognosticated their defeat in Africa (*Africi belli praeiudicia*,

32.13). These two speeches of Curio, perhaps more than any other single factor in *BC*, reveal new dimensions in Caesar as a writer. They are the longest direct speeches in his works, but the artistry with which they are written is even more significant.[11] In scorning the extremism of his officers' proposals in the first speech, Curio commends himself as a man of *virtus*, unshaken by the ignoble passions of fright and despair. However, his remarks abound in platitudes and commonplaces suggesting a naïve view of the world,[12] much as is found in the opening remarks of Sophocles' Oedipus or Creon. The second speech reveals Curio's naïvete progressing to hybris, as past success is interpreted as sure proof of Fortune's special favor and future success.[13]

C. Catastrophe: 2.36–44.

Curio's address won back the loyalty of his troops. On the next day he led them to a nearly decisive rout of the enemy. With the Pompeians cowering inside the walls of Utica and the townspeople urging Varus to surrender, the African campaign seemed on the brink of a victorious conclusion. But at the peak of Curio's fortunes reports came announcing the imminent arrival of King Juba with a large body of troops. Because of his hybristic state of mind (*tantam habebat suarum rerum fiduciam*, 37.1) Curio at first did not believe the reports. Finally, the reports were substantiated, and he decided to withdraw. But when deserters from Utica claimed that Juba had been recalled by trouble in

[11] There is little reason to believe that the speeches are authentic. J. H. Collins, *Propaganda, Ethics, and Psychological Assumptions in Caesar's Writings* (Frankfurt 1952) 97–98, compares the conservative position of Rice Holmes with the rather liberal view of Alfred Klotz, and agrees with the latter that the speeches are free compositions. Holmes believes that much of the substance of the speeches is authentic but the composition is Caesar's.

[12] 31.3, "quasi non et felicitas rerum gestarum exercitus benevolentiam imperatoribus et res adversae odia concilient"; 31.4, "neque pudentis suspicari oportet sibi parum credi neque improbos scire sese timeri"; 31.6, "uti corporis vulnera, ita exercitus incommoda sunt tegenda"; 31.7, "namque huiusmodi res aut pudore aut metu tenentur, quibus rebus nox maxime adversaria est." On this point see also Rasmussen (above, note 10) 107.

[13] Generally these speeches are interpreted as revealing Curio in a favorable light; see Collins (above, note 11) 98. But Rasmussen (above, note 10) 109 states the true function of the speeches: "Es ist nun aber unwahrscheinlich, dass Caesar mit Hilfe dieser direkten Reden lediglich die Glorifikation eines Untergebenen bewirken will, der eine so schwere Niederlage . . . verschuldet hat. Caesars Thema ist im Grunde nicht der Charakter Curios, sondern die Niederlage, die er niemals als eine Folge mangelnder *virtus* dargestellt hat."

his kingdom, Curio rashly believed (*temere credens*, 38.2) and resumed the offensive. At this point in the narrative Caesar presents the reasons for Curio's folly—*adulescentia, magnitudo animi, superioris temporis proventus, fiducia rei bene gerendae* (38.2). It is an oversimplification of Caesar's intentions as a writer to regard these reasons as an attempt either to censure or to palliate; together, they provide the recipe of the tragic hero, of which each ingredient has been carefully prepared and added to the drama. The order in which the reasons are presented is not accidental; it traces the chain of cause and effect to the beginning of catastrophe.

With the all-too-willing acceptance of false information Curio's folly has begun. When informed by prisoners that Saburra, not Juba, had been their leader, Curio completely misconstrued the information and voiced his third direct speech, in which hybris and folly are the dominant expressions (39.2–3):

> Videtisne, inquit, milites, captivorum orationem cum perfugis convenire? abesse regem, exiguas esse copias missas, quae paucis equitibus pares esse non potuerint? proinde ad praedam, ad gloriam properate, ut iam de praemiis vestris et de referenda gratia cogitare incipiamus.

The cavalry, likewise caught up by hybris after a victory over Saburra's advance forces, exaggerated their exploit to the extent that time alone seemed to hinder final victory. Because of their general's impatient haste to close with the enemy, the army began to disintegrate into groups of stragglers; but not even this put the damper on Curio's hopes (*ne haec quidem res Curionem ad spem morabatur*, 39.6). Meanwhile Juba and Saburra had already begun to execute their deadly strategy. While the King's forces remained out of sight, Saburra feigned retreat in order to lead Curio into the ambush. Curio blindly accepted Saburra's ploy and led his army out of the heights, its last sanctuary, into the plain. This final and fatal error is underscored by Caesar just before the denouement: *Curio ad superiorem spem addita praesentis temporis opinione hostis fugere arbitratus copias ex locis superioribus in campum deducit* (40.3).

The denouement traces, step by step, the destruction of the army. At first, the troops responded to Curio's exhortations; but gradually their exhaustion, skillfully exploited by Juba's tactics, began to tell.

The soldiers, who shortly before abounded in confidence, lost hope; all were filled with fright and grief. Curio, after ordering a desperate bid for the nearest high ground only to see the enemy anticipate him, rejected Domitius' suggestion to flee, and was killed fighting. A few of the cavalry escaped, but the infantry was annihilated. The despondency and panic at the main camp prevented an orderly evacuation, so that only a few soldiers managed to return safely to Sicily. The rest surrendered to Varus, but the majority of these were put to death at Juba's command.

Of all the dramatic episodes in Caesar's writings, the Curio episode is the most organically constructed. It succeeds in demonstrating the interaction of external and internal causes, whereas the two previously examined episodes merely suggest it. The exposition of Curio's successful achievements leads naturally to a demonstration of their impact on his thinking. But even in his thinking, as revealed in the direct speeches, there is a development from a calm, if somewhat naïve, confidence to hybris. Hybris leads to folly, as Curio commits a succession of rash judgments and acts. The peripeteia is Curio's first act of folly, and it is marked by Caesar's recapitulation of the causes which led to it—youth, magnanimity, previous success, and hybris. Caesar's fulsome account of the denouement is in the best tragic style. Disaster follows disaster, beginning with the despair of Curio's forces and continuing to the execution of the last remnant. Highly effective is the treatment of Juba, whose imminence is constantly felt, although he is never focused as a concrete personality. Juba is the impersonal instrument of fate, the terrifying mockery of Curio's hybris and folly.

FOURTH EPISODE: 3.59–99

A. Success: 3.62–71.

After a long stalemate at Dyrrachium, impetus for a decisive struggle was provided by the desertion of two Allobrogians from Caesar's camp. Although Pompey had planned to break Caesar's encirclement, the information brought to him by the deserters prompted immediate action. His assault against the weakest part of Caesar's fortifications was a complete success. Caesar's attempt to make

amends for the loss backfired disastrously on the brink of victory. With nearly a thousand seasoned troops killed, with his army shattered in morale and intact thanks only to Pompey's hesitation to press, Caesar's fortunes were at the lowest point in the campaign.

B. Hybris: 3.72–87.

The success of the Pompeians, significant though not decisive, quickly brought on hybris. They no longer gave serious attention to the conduct of the war but thought that they had already conquered: *his rebus tantum fiduciae ac spiritus Pompeianis accessit, ut non de ratione belli cogitarent sed vicisse iam sibi viderentur* (72.1). They failed to reckon the battle's fortuities, which had been their major asset; and, instead, they celebrated the day's victory throughout the world as if they had conquered through courage and no change of fortunes could occur: *proinde ac si virtute vicissent neque ulla commutatio rerum posset accidere* (72.4). Pompey himself shared the overweening attitude of his followers. He circulated a letter grossly exaggerating his victory and Caesar's losses (79.4). In a welcoming speech to Scipio's army he invited the soldiers to share in the booty and bonuses, since the victory had been procured already (82.1). The expectation of victory was so high that whatever time intervened merely seemed to delay a return to Italy. Caesar, after describing the contentious behavior in Pompey's camp, concludes (83.4):

> postremo omnes aut de honoribus suis aut de praemiis pecuniae aut de persequendis inimicitiis agebant, nec quibus rationibus superare possent sed quem ad modum uti victoria deberent cogitabant.

The direct speeches of Pompey and Labienus are the culminating touch to the hybristic portrayal. Both content and placement demonstrate Caesar's artistry. Fatuity pervades Pompey's remarks, and the ironic preface, *scio me . . . paene incredibilem rem polliceri* (86.2), is fully justified, as he declares that the war will be concluded without danger to the legions and almost without casualties (86.4). Whereas Pompey stressed the superiority of his army, Labienus, whose speech immediately follows, stresses the alleged weaknesses of the enemy. Like his commander, Labienus ironically defends his arrogance—*neque temere incognitam rem pronuntio* (87.2). The finale of the two speeches is the oath

proposed by Labienus and eagerly recited by Pompey and his lieutenants: they will not return to the camp except as victors.

The placement of the speeches is of special interest. In the narrative, Pompey's speech follows the brief remarks of Caesar just before the battle lines are drawn up, but in point of time Pompey's speech is much earlier. Because of its position in the narrative, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the speech is Pompey's final exhortation to the troops before the battle, although Caesar states that it was uttered in a staff meeting during the previous days (86.1). The location of Pompey's speech is effective in two ways: by following the brief and sober words of Caesar, Pompey's hybristic words are in stark contrast; and by the speech's insertion shortly before the battle, dramatic tension is increased in preparation for the peripeteia.

C. Catastrophe: 3.94.3–99.5.

The peripeteia, specifically pointed out by Caesar as the *initium victoriae* (94.3) for himself and the *initium fugae* (94.4) for the Pompeians, occurred when the fourth battle line stopped the vaunted cavalry charge which was to have provided Pompey's easy victory. It was at this point, Caesar states, that Pompey lost his confidence (*diffisus*, 94.5) and returned to camp. The oath, so readily recited, had proved impossible to fulfill. At the camp Pompey ordered the garrison to prepare for a defense and stated that he would go around to all the gates to exhort the guards. But instead he went directly to his tent where he remained, *summae rei diffidens et tamen eventum expectans* (94.6). Caesar's use of direct speech for Pompey's instructions and promise to the garrison, followed immediately by the narrative of his contrary actions, emphasizes the disparity between his words and his deeds, which the peripeteia has revealed. It also illustrates the strange inertia of the tragic victim caught up in the fascination of disaster.

The rout of the battle line is followed by the storming of the Pompeian camp. The reversal of fortunes is underscored by Caesar's description of the camp's luxurious appearance which indicated *victoriae fiduciam* (96.1). One could readily see that the Pompeians had entertained no fear about the outcome of the day. In the meantime Pompey had divested himself of his uniform and departed for Larisa, complaining, when he boarded ship there, that he had appeared almost

betrayed by the men in whom he had hopes of victory. The denouement is completed when the last major elements of Pompey's shattered army surrender the next day (98).

In the accounts of four crucial events in the Civil War a structure consisting of good fortune, hybris, and catastrophe can be seen; but it is most elaborate in the African and Greek campaigns. In fact these last two accounts have a certain literary resemblance. Both contain some of the longest passages of direct speech in Caesar's writings; and these speeches, unlike other direct speeches in the commentaries, express almost exclusively the hybris and folly of the tragic victim shortly before his downfall. Both Curio and Pompey are prematurely proclaimed *imperatores* as the result of their initial successes.[14] In the case of each a trusted lieutenant, skilled in warfare, is mentioned. He is given a direct speech, the main purpose of which is to reinforce his commander's resolve at a critical moment.[15] The main resemblance, however, lies in Caesar's description of hybris in the two leaders and their armies. Here the reader will find close similarities of thought and language, such as the following:

1. Exaggeration of achievements

Curio's cavalry: haec tamen ab ipsis inflatius commemorabantur (2.39.4).

Pompey: a Pompeio litteris per omnes provincias civitatesque dimissis de proelio ad Dyrrachium facto elatius inflatiusque multo, quam res erat gesta (3.79.4).

2. Fiducia[16]

[14] The title of *imperator* has sinister implications for Curio and Pompey, who receive it from their troops. For Scipio, who conferred it on himself (3.31.1), it is similarly devoid of meaning. Only once is Caesar called *imperator*, and that by the enemy troops (1.74.2); in this instance Caesar lives up to the title. One might find in Curio and Pompey a diffident attitude about it. Curio ends his speech by saying, "equidem me Caesaris militem dici volui, vos me imperatoris nomine appellavistis. cuius si vos paenitet, vestrum vobis beneficium remitto, mihi meum restituite nomen, ne ad contumeliam honorem dedisse videamini" (2.32.14). In any case, the passage is highly ironic. Pompey kept the title and permitted himself to be greeted by it, but "neque in litteris adscribere est solitus, neque in fascibus insignia laureae praetulit" (3.71.3).

[15] For Curio's lieutenant, Rebilus, and his speech, see 2.34.4. Labienus plays a much more important supporting role to Pompey; see his speeches in 3.19.8 and 87.1–5.

[16] In *BC*, *fiducia* is almost synonymous with hybris, and it forebodes ill to those who possess it. See Rasmussen (above, note 10) 121–22.

Curio: tantam . . . suarum rerum fiduciam (2.37.1).
Pompeians: tantum fiduciae (3.72.1).
Curio: fiducia rei bene gerendae (2.38.2).
Pompeians: victoriae fiduciam (3.96.1).

3. Over-anticipation of victory
Curio: ut quidquid intercederet temporis, hoc omne victoriam morari videretur (2.39.5).
Pompeians: ut, quidquid intercederet temporis, id morari reditum in Italiam videretur (3.82.2).

4. Premature celebration of victory
Curio: vos autem incerta victoria Caesarem secuti diiudicata iam belli fortuna victum sequamini, cum vestri officii praemia percipere debeatis (2.32.6)?
Pompey: Scipionis milites cohortatur, ut parta iam victoria praedae ac praemiorum velint esse participes (3.82.1).

5. Disrespect for the enemy forces
Curio: iam ab initio copias P. Atti Vari despiciens (2.23.1).
Labienus: cum Caesaris copias despiceret (3.87.1).

6. Inferior estimate of enemy strength
Curio: temere credens (2.38.2) . . . exiguas esse copias missas (2.39.2).
Labienus: neque temere incognitam rem pronuntio. perexigua pars illius exercitus superest (3.87.2).

Although other instances of parallelisms of thought and language may be seen in Caesar's writings,[17] it is particularly important to note those which describe hybris. Caesar's concern with the theme was serious and his treatment consistent. It is not isolated but stands as a vital link in the chain of events. It has a cause (success) and becomes the cause of something else (catastrophe). It is not a *res gesta* in the strictest sense; but it occupies its own place in the historical context as a result of Caesar's interpretation and skill.[18]

The presence of dramatic structures in Caesar's *Bellum Civile* is further evidence of his development as an historian.[19] These structures

[17] No doubt such parallelisms are due to Caesar's *elegantia*. It is remarkable that studies devoted to Caesar's method of expression have paid little attention to its formulaic quality. I find no mention of it in Oskar Dernoscheck, *De elegantia Caesaris* (Leipzig 1903). Alfred Klotz, *Cäsarstudien* (Leipzig 1910) 5–8, noticed several formulae in *BG*, but remarked that they were less frequent in *BC*.

[18] I have not seen M. Hennicke, *Die Hybris in Geschichtspiel Thucydides und Caesars* (Athens 1966). Elsewhere I find only passing mention of this most prominent theme.

[19] It is tempting at this point to plunge into the problem of the literary form of Caesar's writings. Alfred Klotz (above, note 17) 11 states, "Wir sehen also, dass allmählich die

are not readily discernible in *Bellum Gallicum*, although certain of the episodes would have admitted them. Essential to dramatic structure is a fulsome description of hybris, and this description is most effectively conveyed in *BC* by speeches. But in *BG* it is plain that Caesar has not exploited speeches to enhance the dramatic effect. To cite but one example, the speech of Critognatus in *BG* (7.77.3–16) voices an attitude of nihilistic despair, whereas Curio's complex of speeches culminates in flagrant hybris in preparation for the catastrophe.

Dramatic structure was a method of presenting history which had been employed at least from the time of Herodotus.[20] For some historians it was a means for creating sensationalism, and no rhetorical ornament or distortion of the truth was spared to achieve this end. But for others, Herodotus among them, it provided the possibility of instructing, of driving home a moral.[21] It is to the latter group that Caesar must be assigned. His use of the dramatic structure with hybris as its centrum in the four most critical actions of the Civil War enables him to demonstrate (not merely assert) human responsibility for success or failure in the realm of world affairs. Repeatedly, he emphasizes the necessity of the leader of men to control rigorously not only adversity but also prosperity.[22] Like Herodotus, Caesar believed that "prosperity is a slippery thing, and the more important extension of it, that power is even more dangerous because it is corrupting, because it leads to hubris."[23]

literarische Form der *commentarii* vernachlässicht wird: Cäsar wird unwillkürlich zum darstellenden Historiker." But, after reading most of the opinions on the subject, I am inclined to think that the water has been muddied enough. Michel Rambaud (above, note 1) 60, expresses my sentiments perfectly: "C'est, à mon sens, une entreprise bien hasardeuse, plus théorique que conforme aux réalités, que de prétendre expliquer l'oeuvre de César à partir de la notion de *commentarii*." The title "historian" for Caesar is meant to be taken in a general and flexible sense.

[20] See A. W. Gomme, *The Greek Attitude to Poetry and History* (Berkeley 1954) 73 *et passim*.

[21] The moralistic writers tend to be identified with the plain style (see Ullman [above, note 7] 43), a fact which tallies nicely with Cicero's description of the commentaries: "nudi enim sunt, recti et venusti, omni ornatu orationis tamquam veste detracta" (*Brutus* 292).

[22] A good example of Caesar's wariness in the face of prosperity is found in the first phase of the Spanish campaign, when, after the enemy had been brought to bay, he was urged to press the attack. His reply was, "cur denique fortunam periclitaretur? praesertim cum non minus esset imperatoris consilio superare quam gladio" (1.72.2).

[23] A. W. Gomme (above, note 20) 81.